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Abstract 
 
It is the fact that providing secure communication for 
wireless networks has become one of the prime 
concerns.  Quantum cryptography, namely Quantum 
Key Distribution (QKD), offers the promise of 
unconditional security.  However, traditional QKD can 
work well is because of the full optical system will meet 
the requirement of photon communication, which 
becomes serious problem in wireless communication 
system, as in free space photon transmission is the 
difficulty in providing Line-of-Sight (LOS) between the 
transmitter and the receiver for long distances.  In the 
current paper, we are going to focus on two 
dimensional (2D) fuzzy dynamic controllers for 
switching between the transmitter and the receiver for 
reasonable long distances.  The research results show 
fuzzy dynamic switching has potential capability to 
carry on this project and the future papers will follow 
for 3D cases. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
As the wireless communication has gone through 
rapid advancements during the last few decades, an 
increasing number of government agencies, businesses 
and home users are either using, or considering using, 
wireless technologies in their environments [1, 4, 20, 
24]. Therefore it is the fact that in the near future 
wireless technology will dominate the communication 
industry. While wireless networks and its applications 
are becoming popular every day, security issues 
associated with have become a great concern. In this 
paper we are going to make a novel protocol with a 
method to create an implementation of quantum 
cryptography for key distribution in Wi-Fi networks. 
As wireless communications use the airwaves, they 
are intrinsically more vulnerable to interceptions and 
attacks than their wired counterparts. As the service 
become more popular, there are a great number of 
security risks associated with the current wireless 
protocols and encryption methods [6, 8]. Some of the 
common types of attacks against wireless networks are; 
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, Identity theft (MAC 
spoofing), Man-in-the-middle attacks, ARP poisoning, 
etc. DoS attacks are typically associated with 802.11 
wireless communications [24]. 
Based on the laws of physics, quantum cryptography 
allows exchange of cryptographic key between two 
remote parties with unconditional security.   Quantum 
cryptography is used to produce and distribute a key, 
known as Quantum Key Distribution (QKD). Several 
QKD protocols such as BB84 [7], B92 [21] and six-
state [18] exist in optical communications, in particular 
with optical fiber systems, as of now. Out of those, 
BB84 is more popular and widely used in practical 
networks [26]. As the nature of BB84 and B92 [7, 18, 
21, 22, 23] we have chosen a variation of BB84 called 
SARG04 (Scarani, Acin, Ribordy, and Gisin) [22] to 
employ in our current work. SARG04 is robust against 
photon-number splitting (PNS) attack [22, 23]. 
Explaining how SARG04 protocol works is not in 
scope of this paper.  QKD has gone through significant 
advancements in optical networks [17, 19]. However, 
QKD with respect to free-space is showing rather slow 
progress. One of the main reasons for this slow 
progress in free space photon transmission is the 
difficulty in providing Line-Of-Sight (LOS) between 
the transmitter and the receiver for long distances.  
However, there are some papers discussed this issue 
[23], we may use different models for different 
situations of the multi-path communication channels, 
such as almost-LOS (ALOS), quasi-LOS (QLOS), 
non-LOS (NLOS) with responding statistic 
distributions, which will not be discussed in our 
current paper.  
In our work, we target the IEEE 802.11 wireless 
network to integrate with quantum cryptography with 
fuzzy logic control. This is because the coverage area 
of 802.11 network small, the line-of-sight issue 
between the participating entities can be minimized. 
Therefore, currently we assume the LOS problem is 
not major concern in this paper. 
In this paper we are focusing on how to deal with 
LOS problem with Fuzzy logic method.  Next we shall 
discuss IEEE 802.11i standard then we highlight our 
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QKD system, by which LOS problem will occur.  In 
the section IV we show our fuzzy system for 
switching.  The conclusion will present in section V. 
 
2. IEEE 802.11i Standard 
 
Before we introduce our new protocol, we need to 
have a closer look at IEEE 802.11i standard as some of 
which shall be introduced into our current work.  The 
security of 802.11 is defined by Wired Equivalent 
Privacy (WEP).  However WEP was identified by 
cryptanalysts to have severe security weaknesses. As a 
result of this, an amendment to the IEEE 802.11 
standard called IEEE 802.11i [3] was approved in 
2004. 
IEEE 802.11i is designed to provide enhanced 
security in the Medium Access Control (MAC) layer 
for 802.11 networks. It defines two classes of security 
algorithms: Robust Security Network Association 
(RSNA) and Transition Security Network (TSN). IEEE 
802.11i describes two new confidentiality algorithms 
to address those two cipher suites, namely Temporal 
Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) and Counter-
mode/CBC-MAC Protocol (CCMP) respectively [12].  
IEEE 802.1X offers an effective framework for 
authenticating, managing keys and controlling user 
traffic to protect large networks. It employs the 
Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) [13] to 
allow a wide variety of authentication mechanisms, 
which we are going to keep it in our current work.  The 
EAP integration with QKD will be discussed in the 
next section. 
RSNA defines two types of key hierarchies to divide 
initial key material into useful keys. The two key 
hierarchies are: Pairwise key hierarchy, which is used 
to protect unicast traffic and, Group key hierarchy 
which is used to protect multicast and broadcast traffic. 
We can show the Pairwise key hierarchy in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1.   IEEE 802.11i Pairwise Key Hierarchy [3].  
 
3. QKD for Wireless Networks 
 
Quantum cryptography or QKD is one area that did 
not get enough attention in wireless networks so far 
with respect to providing secrete key distribution.  
Even though there are lots of things need to be 
investigated before this technology applies to the real 
world.  Our current work is part of the contributions 
toward to the final successful target.  In this section we 
are going to build a bridge between QKD and wireless 
networks. 
In 802.11i networks there are two places where the 
mutual authentication can be employed. Firstly, by 
selecting a correct EAP type such as EAP-TLS, EAP-
TTLS that offer mutual authentication during IEEE 
802.1X authentication process. Secondly, the IEEE 
802.11i 4-way handshake makes the mutual 
authentication happens in second and third messages. 
In the second message of 4-way handshake, 
authenticator receives the reply and message integrity 
code (MIC) from the supplicant. Authenticator checks 
the received and calculated MIC values to authenticate 
the Supplicant. In the third message, Authenticator 
sends the calculated MIC to the Supplicant.  Supplicant 
then checks the MIC to authenticate the Authenticator, 
achieving mutual authentication. 
In our work, we paid special attention on the stage 
where the mutual authentication takes place in 802.11i 
networks. Therefore, we shall take the advantage of 
EAP types such as EAP-TLS, EAP-TTLS which offer 
mutual authentication, to merge 802.11i networks with 
QKD. In order to make QKD well match wireless 
communications, i.e. our aim is to introduce quantum 
key transmission soon after the 802.1X authentication 
is completed. The proposed protocol is shown in figure 
2. 
As described in flow 13 of figure 1, the last message 
of 802.1X protocol is the EAPOL message giving the 
EAP Key from Authenticator to the Supplicant. Since 
the two parties are mutually authenticated at this stage, 
we know that this message is genuine. We use this 
message as the starting point of quantum transmission. 
By this way we can safely start the quantum key 
exchange. As soon as the Supplicant receives the EAP 
Key message, the communication switches to quantum 
channel. 
Once the photon transmission finishes, the 
communication switches back to classical wireless 
channel. Afterwards they complete the SARG04 
quantum key exchange as shown in flows 3 to 6 of 
Figure 2.  Some of the transferred bits will get 
discarded during the final key recovery process of 
SARG04 protocol.  Our next aim is to set the length of 
Q-Key equal to the length of PTK.  For example, 
CCMP, PTK is 256 bits, while TKIP occupies 384 bits 
for PMK.  So that we have to make sure the derived Q-
Key will contain bits greater than or equal to the 
number of bits of PTK.   We get this stripped Q-Key as 
the PTK.   
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Figure 2.   The Proposed Protocol 
 Then from PTK, we can derive KEK, KCK and 
TK, while from KCK, MIC can be calculated. We shall 
use this MIC in our subsequent protocol messages to 
implement mutual authentication. In order to simplify 
the operation in wireless networks at this stage, 
Supplicant performs XOR operation with the MIC and 
the first set of bits of equal length in PMK. We call this 
resulted MIC as Quantum MIC (Q-MIC) and make the 
following protocol:   
 
Q-MIC = (MIC) XOR (first bits of PMK equivalent  
                             to the length of MIC) 
  
Supplicant verifies the Q-MIC to authenticate the 
Authenticator, thus achieving the mutual 
authentication. From now on, both parties use TK to 
encrypt the data and start secure communication and 
also use the GTK for multicast applications if needed. 
Recent research work explores some of the flaws of 
4-way handshake [5, 6, 8, 16]. It was shown that the 
message 1 of 4-way handshake is subject to DoS 
attacks.  For example, intruders can flood message 1 to 
the supplicant after the 4-way handshake has 
completed, causing the system to fail. Since key 
distribution of our protocol is done by the SARG04 
protocol. 
 In order to under our protocol let’s assume an 
eavesdropper send a fake photon transmission towards 
Authenticator soon after the EAP Key message (flow 2 
of Figure 2).  Then once the Q-Key is derived by 
SARG04 process, supplicant sends Q-MIC to 
Authenticator in flow 7. Authenticator can check this 
Q-MIC value as it has all the ingredients to generate its 
own Q-MIC.   
 
4. Fuzzy Switching System in QKD 
 
It is clear, from above description, that the photon 
communication becomes a vital issue in QKD.  For the 
802.11 networks, even it has a reasonable good area 
covering the communications but for QKD it would be 
a problem to “just” transmitter right hitting receiver, 
which is called “LOS” problem.  We propose a 2D 
fuzzy switching system as shown in this section to 
tentatively run our system, which shows that the 
dynamic switching has good potential for our system.   
The future 3D system will follow in our next paper. 
The fuzzy decision problem introduced by Bellman 
and Zadeh [27] has as a goal the maximization of the 
minimum value of the membership functions of the 
objectives to be optimized.  Accordingly, the fuzzy 
optimization model can be represented as a 
multiobjective programming problem as follows [20]: 
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In above equation, the objective is to maximize the 
minimum membership function of all delay, denoted 
by D, and difference between the recommend value 
and the measured value, denoted by U. 
The Fuzzy control system is extended from [20] and 
shown in Figure 3.  The first estimated angle is input 
and then the set motor controller will run follow the 
feedback values from the photon receiver & 
comparing.  The outputs are three: anti-clock (or called 
“negative”); no change (or called “zero”); and 
clockwise (or called “positive”).  There are two ranges 
are defined, namely “negative” = -100 to 0.0) and 
“positive” = 0.0 to +100. 
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Figure 3.  Fuzzy Control system 
There are two inputs for this control system, namely 
(1) the “difference” of the angles between the existed 
value and the measured value, which is for the step 
motor to just the transmitter and receiver direction.  
When those two values are perfectly matching, the 
LOS is recognized and this “difference” ideal value 
would be zero. (2) the “differential” of the angles that 
describe how “quickly” to get the angles changed and 
in which direction changing (anti-clock or clockwise 
directions).  Those two inputs are shown in Figure 4 
with some values we have used in our testing. 
For the rule structure and matrix, we have: 
1. If the existed angle value – measured value = 
negative and d(existed angle value –measured 
value)/dt = negative THEN output = anti-clock 
turn 
2. If the existed angle value – measured value = zero 
and d(existed angle value –measured value)/dt = 
negative THEN output = clockwise turn 
3. If the existed angle value – measured value = 
positive and d(existed angle value –measured 
value)/dt = negative THEN output = anti-clock 
turn 
4. If the existed angle value – measured value = 
negative and d(existed angle value –measured 
value)/dt = zero THEN output = anti-clock turn 
5. If the existed angle value – measured value = zero 
and d(existed angle value –measured value)/dt = 
zero THEN output = no change (zero) 
6. If the existed angle value – measured value = 
positive and d(existed angle value –measured 
value)/dt = zero THEN output = clockwise turn 
7. If the existed angle value – measured value = 
negative and d(existed angle value –measured 
value)/dt = positive THEN output = anti-clock turn 
 
 
Figure 4.  Degree of Memberships for the two input in our fuzz 
control system. 
8. If the existed angle value – measured value = zero 
and d(existed angle value –measured value)/dt = 
positive THEN output = anti-clock turn 
9. If the existed angle value – measured value = 
positive and d(existed angle value –measured 
value)/dt = positive THEN output = clockwise turn 
Therefore, we have the matrix from the nine rules to 
as shown in below: 
 
 
 
 
where AC= anti-clock direction; CW=clockwise 
direction and NC= no change (or zero). 
As an example, we have two inputs say “difference” 
= -6 and “differential” = +2.5, as shown in Figure 5. 
The calculation result is -63.4% anti-clock direction 
as shown in Figure 6 and defuzzification process for 
crisp output is taken by “root sum square” (RSS).  
Some final testing results are shown in below: 
1. Two inputs: “difference” = -3 and “differential” 
= +1.25 then output = -55.1% anti-clock 
direction; 
2. Two inputs: “difference” = 0 and “differential” 
= +2.5 then output = -50.1% anti-clock 
direction; 
3. Two inputs: “difference” = +3 and 
“differential” = +2.5 then output = -10.8% anti-
clock direction; 
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4. Two inputs: “difference” = +1 and 
“differential” = +2.5 then output = +12.1% 
clockwise direction; 
The dynamic control system works and the result is 
fairly reasonable, which gives the enough photon to be 
communicated by the wireless channel. 
 
 
Figure 5.  An example for the fuzzy calculation. Two inputs say 
“difference” = -6 and “differential” = +2.5. 
  
 
 
 
Figure 6.  An example for the fuzzy calculation. The Output of the 
Fuzzy controller. 
  
5. Conclusions 
 
Risks are inherent in wireless technology. Most 
significant source of risks in wireless networks is that 
the technology’s underlying communication medium, 
the airwave, is open to intruders. Due to this reason a 
lot of efforts have been put to address security issues in 
wireless networks.   
The advantage of quantum cryptography over 
traditional key exchange methods is that the exchange 
of information can be shown to be secure in a very 
strong sense, without making assumptions about the 
intractability of certain mathematical problems. But the 
LOS problem becomes one of major barriers in this 
application.  In our work, we take advantage of fuzzy 
logical control in our designed QKD system to merge 
with IEEE 802.11i wireless network.  We have noted 
the there is huge potential capability to carry on this 
project and the future papers will follow for 3D cases 
due to the conference paper size. 
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